In order for rational choice theory (RCT) to explain the production of collective action, it must be able to distinguish between two behaviorally identical possibilities: one, that all of the agents in a group are each performing behaviors in pursuit of a set of individual actions; and two, that all of those agents are performing those behaviors in pursuit of a collective action. I argue that traditional RCT does not have the resources necessary to distinguish between these two possibilities. I go on to argue that there are several ways in which we might modify the resources of RCT so as to be able to account for this distinction. The most effective solution, I argue, is to incorporate constraints into our RCT, so that deliberation in pursuit of a collective action is distinct from deliberation in pursuit of individual action in virtue of the presence of these characteristic collective constraints.
1
One virtue of a good explanatory model is that it is capable of explaining why event e occurs rather than event e , for some domain of events E which is within the explanatory purview of the model. Then, for certain domains of events, rational choice theory (RCT) is a good explanatory model. Given a set of actions a ∈ A, where every a is an individual action, RCT can explain why agent X performed action a 1 rather than action a 2 : namely, because X is rational, and because X judges that a 1 is more likely to produce a more highly-valued outcome than action a 2 .
As I argue in this paper, however, for another domain of events RCT is not a very good explanatory model at all. Suppose that b ∈ B is a set of actions, but suppose instead that B consists of both individual and collective actions. RCT is not a good explanatory model over this set of events because, given particular actions b i and b c , where b i is an individual action and b c is a collective action, RCT cannot explain why b i occurred rather than action b c . What are the properties of b i and b c such that this holds? As I explain below, if b i and b c are behaviorally indistict, such that the behaviors performed by the agents X and Y are identical between b i and b c , then RCT does not have the resources necessary to distinguish between the two.
My argument proceeds as follows. First, I describe the resources that a typical RCT makes available to us for explanation; I call this RCT traditional RCT. I then argue that traditional RCT cannot distinguish between individual actions and collective actions. I survey the available conservative modifications of traditional RCT that can account for collective actions and I conclude that plural subject RCT is the most plausible. I then present a slightly more liberal modification of traditional RCT; I argue that if we add a primitive element to our RCT which represents constraints, then we can distinguish between individual and collective actions. I conclude that plural subject RCT faces problems that a constraint-based RCT does not.
2
Rational choice explanations are, generally speaking, very good explanations. In particular, rational choice explanations are useful as part of an explanation of action because rational choice explanations effectively serve to highlight the agent's reasons for acting.
There are many different things that we might mean by 'rational choice explanation'; let us, then, stipulate the following interpretation for the present work. A rational choice explanation is one which explains agent X's performing some action a (or choosing to perform some action a; we can take the two to be the same thing) in virtue of the fact that X is rational, and a is judged by X to be an optimal action given the decision problem G that X sees herself as facing. Note that, on this account of a rational choice explanation, the reasons subjectively explain the action-that is, the explanation goes by way of the agent's beliefs about the decision problem that she faces, and about the desirability of her available actions, rather than by way of the objective facts about the decision problem she faces or about the desirability of her actions. This ensures that our rational choice explanation does not bypass the agent's agency. In order for some behavior to be an action, the performing agent must stand in the right intentional relationship to the behavior, and rational choice explanations cannot appeal to these intentional properties if rational choice explanations work by way of objective features of decision problems.
As a generalization of rational choice theory, we model the decision problem G (for agent X) as follows: G consists of a set of agents; a set of actions for each agent (which I will sometimes call behaviors when I try to avoid begging the question of what kind of action it is); a set of outcomes which can be produced; a value ordering for each agent over outcomes, such that if an agent judges herself or himself to have more reason to bring about outcome o i than o j , then the agent's value function will rank o i higher than o j ; and an outcome function which maps action profiles onto outputs. 1 Given a decision problem G, an action a * is considered rationalizable for agent X so long as it contributes to the production of the most highly-valued outcome it is possible 1 Because we are taking decision problems to be indexed to agents, a number of counter-intuitive results follow, especially for those accustomed to modeling objective decision problems. For example, because agents might hold false beliefs about the actions available to other agents, the agents might jointly bring about an outcome which is not represented in any of their subjective decision problems (and which therefore is not represented in the value ordering). Though counter-intuitive, these results do not, I think, pose any serious threat to the desirability of using such subjective decision theory models for the current project.
to produce given X's value-ranking of outcomes. In parametric choice situations-that is, when the number of agents is 1-the rationalizable actions are those which straightforwardly maximize the value of the outcome produced by the outcome function. 2 In situations of non-parametric choice-when the number of agents is two or more-an action is rationalizable for agent X when the action is a part of that action profile which is a solution to the decision problem. We can skirt the thorny question of what a good solution concept for games is; in what follows bellow, when we need a solution concept we will assume for simplicity that a Nash equilibrium (or some intuitively appealing refinement of a set of Nash equilibria) will suffice.
It is now apparent why rational choice models are useful for the explanation of actions. Suppose X is rational, and X performs some action a * . An integral part of any explanation for why X performed a * (rather than other available actions a 1 , a 2 , etc.) is that X judges a * to be better supported by her reasons at the time of the action. 3 And we can nicely capture the idea of one action being more rationally supported by an agent's reasons than another by appealing to the agent's value ranking of the outcomes that the actions are believed to produce.
3
Rational choice theory is thus well-suited to explaining choices and behaviors, because rational choice theory indicates the outcomes that agents find it justified to bring about, and also indicates choices that agents might make so as to bring about more-justified outcomes rather than less-justified outcomes. But how broadly applicable is the theory? In other words, what is the domain of decision problems over which rational choice theory provides a good explanation of choices and behaviors?
The RCT that we presented in section 2 (which we will call, somewhat misleadingly, traditional RCT) is deficient, however; there are events that the theory is incapable of explaining. In order to make this claim clear, however, it is important to say what is not being claimed here. There is an important line of criticism of rational choice theory which holds that RCT is outcome inadequate. In other words, the criticism is that there are outcomes which are judged to be rational outcomes for agents to bring about independently of our theoretical commitments to any particular version of RCT, and yet RCT does not explain the production of such outcomes when they occur. One example of outcome inadequacy is the class of multiple equilibrium games such as Hi-Lo games (Figure 1 ). In this game (where a X b indicates that X strictly prefers games have two Nash equilibria, and traditional RCT can only explain choices in choice situations which feature a unique Nash equilibrium, owing to the fact that traditional RCT does not have a mechanism for narrowing down to one a set containing more than one equilibrium. 4 The fact that traditional RCT does not have the resources to explain behavior in pursuit of the Hi option in Hi-Lo games is well-known and much discussed; a good overview can be seen in (Sugden 2000 ). Sugden's concern about the foundations of traditional RCT is a worry about the outcome adequacy: if two agents each choose Hi-the outcome that we independently judge it rational for the agents to bring about-traditional RCT does not have the resources to explain such a choice. Outcome inadequacy is not merely a problem for multiple equilibrium games, however. Some theorists worry that the Prisoner's dilemma provides another example of the outcome inadequacy of traditional RCT. Again, the argument is a familiar one: consider a typical one-off Prisoner's dilemma (Figure 2) . We label the cooperative action c, the defective action d. The value rankings for the Prisoner's dilemma are as follows:
In this game we judge it rational independent of our theoretical commitments to RCT for the agents to bring about the o cc outcome. The fact that traditional RCT cannot explain the fact that a o cc outcome is produced shows that traditional RCT is outcome inadequate. For this argument to work, of course, we must judge the o cc outcome to in fact be the rational one for agents to produce. Many defenders of traditional RCT deny
Figure 2: Prisoner's Dilemma this point, and argue that the only rational outcome for agents in a (one-off) Prisoner's dilemma to bring about is the mutual defection o dd outcome, and those whose intuitions run contrary have not yet fully absorbed the logic of the situation. But now comes the important point: I am not interested in defending either side here. And this is for a very important reason, namely that my argument against traditional RCT is not an outcome inadequacy argument. In other words, I am not trying to argue here that traditional RCT cannot rationally justify the production of some outcome that we judge it rational for agents to produce. Most discussions of the limitations of RCT in the context of collective choice do make that argument, or one close to it, but that will not be the focus of the current paper. Even if we suppose that we can modify our RCT however we like so as to ensure that agents find it rational to bring about whatever outcomes we independently judge it rational for the agents to produce, my argument against the use of RCT (whether traditional or modified) in explaining collective actions would still stand.
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Since I am not making the argument that RCT is outcome inadequate, what argument am I making? My argument is this: take some outcome o * , which is produced through the rational choices and behaviors x * and y * of agents X and Y respectively. If there is more than one action (or action-type) corresponding with the production of o * by way of the behaviors x * and y * , I argue, then traditional RCT is explanatorily deficient: it cannot distinguish between the two viable possibilities, and so a fortiori cannot explain why one action was produced rather than another.
I am directing my argument here against the RCT model that I presented in brief detail in section 2. However, the argument generalizes. It is thus not necessary right now to consider every variant model of RCT that has been developed over the yearsand luckily so, as to do so would be impossible. Instead, I present certain features of RCT such that if a model of RCT satisfies these features, then it also lacks the ability to distinguish between the different ways that an outcome might be produced.
What are these features? The following two conditions are necessary for the Prisoner's dilemma example to generalize:
Behavior compositionality: the behavior performed by a group engaged in a collective action is composed without remainder of the behaviors of the individual agents who constitute the group. 5
Act variability: for any behavior a, an agent can justify the performance of this behavior as either contributing to the production of an individual action, or as contributing to the production of a collective action.
These two conditions work from opposite ends. The behavior compositionality condition is a condition on RCTs. According to the behavior compositionality condition, collective actions are behaviorally nothing more than a set of individual behaviors, and so X's behaving in a certain way and Y 's behaving in a certain way jointly suffice for the collective to behave in a certain way (where the existence of a 'collective' here implies that a collective action is being performed). In other words, so long as our RCT is such that the outcome produced is a function of the actions performed by the agents and nothing more, then the behavior of the collective will be nothing more than the behavior of the individuals.
The act variability condition is a condition on collective action. According to the act variability condition, the behaviors that constitute the collective action can be produced either pursuant to an individual action, or pursuant to a collective action. In other words, a collective action is just the behavior of the individuals who make up the collective plus something else, where that 'something else' is not itself a bit of behavior.
So, let us consider an example. Suppose there are two agents, X and Y , each of whom are walking along a path. Let us further suppose, for simplicity, that X and Y are each deciding between two speed at which to walk: they can each either walk quick, or they can walk slow. If they both walk quick, then they walk alongside each other down the path; similarly, if they both walk slow, they walk alongside each other (but more slowly). If one walks quick and the other walks slow, they fail to correlate their walking. This choice situation is given in (Figure 3 ). This game has one pure-strategy equilibrium: o * = (quick, quick). Accordingly, traditional RCT predicts that X and Y will each choose the action quick. That o * is brought about, however, does not yet distinguish between two ways that o * might be brought about, corresponding with two distinct types of action. The first way that o * might be brought about is through two individual actions: X is engaged in an individual action of walking quickly, and Y is engaged in an individual action of walking quickly. The second way that o * might be brought about is through one collective action: X and Y are walking quickly together, and their action is a result of shared agency rather than individual agency.
Is it correct to claim that there might be two different action-types that correspond with the production of the outcome o * ? It is helpful here to turn to Margaret Gilbert's analysis of the phenomenon of two agents walking together in (Gilbert 1996) . Gilbert appeals to the intuitive claim that two agents might be walking alongside one another at the same speed and yet not be walking together. The thing that is missing, Gilbert argues, besides the mere behavioral fact that the agents are walking alongside one another at the same speed is something non-behavioral. For Gilbert, what we need in addition to the performance by X and Y of the requisite behaviors is the presence of a unique kind of directed obligation that holds between X and Y . 6 When X and Y each walk alongside one another in light of their mutual recognition of the unique and directed obligations that hold between them, then their walks constitute a shared action (in this case, a shared walk). When X and Y each walk alongside one another, but fail to do so in light of their mutual recognition of unique and directed obligations between them, they are engaged in a set of individual walks.
We needn't accept Gilbert's particular analysis of the concept of a shared action in order to accept the conclusion that X's and Y 's walking might constitute either a pair of individual walks or one shared walk. Michael Bratman's account of collective action differs from Gilbert's in quite a few important respects: for Bratman collective actions are performed by individual agents, whereas for Gilbert collective actions are performed by a plural subject; Bratman holds no special normative obligations necessarily exist between the participants in a collective action (save those which are generated by their own mental states or by actions they performed to secure coordination with the other), whereas for Gilbert special normative obligations between agents are entailed by the existence of the plural subject. And yet Bratman, like Gilbert, agrees that the distinction between a set of individual actions and a collective action does not lie in the behaviors which the agents perform, but in some non-behavioral component to the action: Shared cooperative activity (SCA) involves, of course, appropriate behaviors. If you and I successfully engage in the SCA of painting the house together then, of course, we paint the house together. But we might paint the house together without acting cooperatively. Perhaps neither of us even knows of the other's activities, or though we each know of the other's activities neither of us cares (Bratman 1992, p. 327). 7 For Bratman, the difference between a collective action and a set of individual actions lies in the intentional mental states with which the constitutive behaviors are performed. In particular, the agents must have non-coerced, cooperatively stable intentions to perform the constitutive behaviors in accordance with, and because of, what Bratman calls 'meshing subplans' (Bratman 1992) . For Bratman, just as for Gilbert, the mere fact that agents X and Y brought about outcome o * in the example above does not yet indicate whether the agents were engaged in a collective action, or whether they were engaged in a pair of individual actions; in order to make such a distinction we need access to additional, non-behavioral facts about X and Y .
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As argued above, there is a difference between collective actions and individual actions, and moreover, that difference is not explainable by appealing to facts about the behaviors that the agents perform. This means that in order for traditional RCT to explain the fact that X and Y are engaged in a collective action (if they are engaged in a collective action), or the fact that they are engaged in individual actions (if they are engaged in individual actions), traditional RCT must first have the resources to distinguish between the two cases, and it cannot do so merely through citing the particular behaviors that the agents perform.
How, then, might a RCT distinguish between a collective action and an individual action in the case where the behavioral components in both cases are the same? The elements of our RCT were laid out in section 2; if our RCT is to account for the difference between behaviorally-identical individual actions and collective actions, then, it must do so via one of those elements.
We cannot account for the difference between individual and collective actions by varying the set of agents engaged in the decision problem. The difference between X's taking an individual walk alongside Y , and X and Y taking shared walk together, does not lie in the fact that, in one case or the other, there are more or fewer agents in the decision problem. There are two ways that such a proposal might work, and, as we will see, neither is satisfactory-although one is a viable option, and its full consideration will be postponed until later in the paper. The first way is that we might try to add more agents to the decision problem. Adding an agent to the decision problem would only make sense, however, if the agent added were responsible for making the difference between the individual and the collective action, and this could only be possible if the added agent (say, 'Z') were the plural subject who performed the collective action. It is not clear what role Z would play, however. X and Y are performing the behaviors which jointly suffice for the behavioral component of the collective action, and so the plural subject Z would have no action to perform and nothing to choose. Of course, the suggestion is implausible from the beginning; we don't think that when X and Y are engaged in a collective action, there are really three agents in the decision problem: X, Y , and the plural agent representing the two of them together. Accommodating plural subject theory by simply adding an agent is the wrong way to go.
We might, on the other hand, think that the proper strategy to distinguish between individual and collective actions is to reduce the number of agents. We might do so for one of two reasons. We might think that the best way to accommodate plural subject theory is to claim that, in cases of collective action, there is only one agent (i.e. the plural subject) in the decision problem rather than two. Or, on the other hand, we might think that the best way to represent individual action is to model the decision problem the individual agent faces as only involving one agent rather than two. The latter strategy can be quickly dismissed; it is simply not the case that individual actions are best modeled as decision problems featuring only one agent. X and Y might each choose to walk quickly because it is in their individual interest to do so, and their walking alongside one another might be nothing more than two individual concurrent actions. The choices of the other agent are relevant for each of their decision-making, however, and so we cannot properly model the decision problem without also including the other agent and her or his contribution to the outcome produced.
And what about the former strategy, namely reducing the number of agents so as to better accommodate a plural subject theory of collective action? This strategy is not so easy to dismiss. The idea here is that the difference between agents X and Y being engaged in a pair of individual actions, and their being engaged in a collective action, is that in the former case there are two agents each performing individual actions, whereas in the latter case there is one agent Z-the plural subject, or joint agent-performing one collective action. This is the strategy that is suggested by Gilbert's analysis of collective action, and would (presumably) be favored by those who reject ontological individualism (as, for instance, in (Epstein 2009) ).
There are challenges to such a strategy. For one, we need to explain how, in cases of collective action, the plural subject performs the same behaviors as the individual subjects do in the individual action case (since, as we argued, the two cases are behaviorally identical). For this to happen, the plural subject must be choosing action profiles which range over the sets of outcomes available to X and Y in the individual case, rather than individual actions. Z, in other words, must choose the action profile (quick, quick) rather than a single action. And the plural subject must have its own value ordering, which might or might not be a function of the individual value orderings of X and Y in the individual case.
These problems are not fatal, however, and overall the strategy is not as implausible as it might initially appear. Indeed, a similar strategy is pursued in (Sugden 2000) (where he allows for the possibility that joint agents might have value orderings) and further developed in (Gold and Sugden 2007) . I argue below that this way of distinguishing between individual and collective actions is inferior to my own proposal, but I take it to be a viable option to consider.
Are there other viable options? We might try to account for the difference between behaviorally-identical individual and collective actions by modifying the sets of actions available to each agent. Here again, the strategy is not promising. The problem with altering the sets of actions available to each agent is that the actions available to X and Y other than the actions chosen are, to a large degree, irrelevant. If X and Y each choose the action quick, then it is irrelevant for distinguishing between an individual and a collective action whether X and Y chose quick out of a set of one potential alternative action, or out of a set of one hundred. In order for the collective and individual cases to be behaviorally identical, X and Y must choose the same behavior in each, and this means that we must hold the chosen behavior fixed while altering the nonchosen behavior. But, as we just saw, the non-chosen behavior is generally irrelevant for determining the character of the chosen behavior.
A similar argument suffices to show that we cannot distinguish between collective and individual actions on the basis of modifying the non-produced outcomes that are available in the decision problem. As in the case of behaviors above, the non-produced outcomes are generally irrelevant in determining the character of the produced outcome: if the production of outcome o 1 rather than o 2 is an individual action, then it will remain an individual action when o 1 is produced rather than o 2 or o 3 -and the same holds vice versa. Varying the non-produced outcome is therefore irrelevant for distinguishing between individual and collective actions.
On the other hand, there is some prima facie reason to think that the distinction between the two cases lies in the produced outcome. Suppose, for instance, that there are two distinct outcomes: o * i , which corresponds to X and Y each taking an individual walk, and o * c , which corresponds to X and Y taking a collective walk. Then a seemingly-plausible account of the difference between the two cases would be that, in the individual action case, the action profile (quick, quick) is mapped (via the outcome function) onto the outcome o * i , whereas in the collective action case the same action profile is mapped onto the outcome o * c . The problem with this proposed solution is that it fails to actually explain the difference between individual and collective actions. Since the behaviors are identical in the two cases, the difference between the two lies in the outcome functions: in the individual action case, the outcome function maps the behaviors onto o It only remains to consider whether the distinction between individual and collective actions might be captured in a RCT by the differences in value orderings. Here, again, is an intuitively promising place to try to find the difference. After all, we might think that the difference between X and Y engaging in an individual action, and their engaging in a collective action, must lie in the sorts of outcomes that they value bringing about-when they act collectively, they value acting collectively, whereas when they act individually, they value acting individually. This approach, though plausible, is not practicable. The problem is that the claim that agents who act individually value acting individually cannot be cashed out with the resources that RCT provides. Value orderings are over outcomes; given a set of outcomes, an agent's value ordering orders those outcomes from more desirable to less desirable. In order for an agent's value ordering to order 'individual action outcomes' over 'collective action outcomes', we have to be able to give a characterization of 'individual action outcomes' and 'collective action outcomes'. But since outcomes are generated from behaviors by way of an outcome function, we again need some way of accounting for the difference between individual action outcomes and collective action outcomes when the behavioral inputs are the same-and, as shown above, this merely pushes the problem back one step. In order for a value ordering to distinguish between individual action outcomes and collective action outcomes, we need an independent characterization of individual action outcomes and collective action outcomes. Appealing to the value ordering function is no more of a solution than appealing to the outcome function.
Perhaps the difference does not lie in the particular ordering of each agent's value ordering, but instead lies in whether the value orderings of the two agents coincide? According to this theory, individual action occurs when agents hold different value orderings over outcomes in a decision problem, whereas collective action occurs when agents hold the same value ordering over outcomes. This approach, however, fails on account of being both too strong and too weak. The account is too strong, because holding the same value ordering is not necessary for collective action; the example we presented in (Figure 3 ) is sufficient to show this. X and Y can engage in a collective action, even though they disagree about the relative values of (quick, slow) and (quick, quick); although X might individually prefer (quick, slow) to (quick, quick), this fact need not prevent her from enaging in a collective action to bring about (quick, quick). It is a common occurrence in cases of collective action that one agent would prefer that the group bring about a different outcome than the one the group is acting towards, but nevertheless contributes to the group's actual goal; those who insist that agents must hold the same value ordering must deny this possibility.
Thus, requiring that agents hold the same value ordering over outcomes is too strong. It is also too weak, in that it is not sufficient for producing a collective action. Even if X and Y had the exact same value ordering over the outcomes, and each chose the action quick, it would still be an open question as to whether they were thereby engaging in an individual action or a collective action. X might be an impatient person and Y might enjoy leisurely walking, and they might also both prefer walking alone to walking alongside another person. There is a value ordering which X and Y can each hold which is compatible with those requirements; does this entail that X and Y are acting collectively when X walks quickly and Y walks slowly? It does not. If we want to know whether an outcome has been produced as a result of an individual action or a collective action, it is not sufficient to know merely that both agents desired the outcome, or even that both agents desired the outcome and agreed in their evaluation of all the non-produced outcomes.
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Within the context of traditional RCT, then, our options for distinguishing between individual actions and collective actions are limited if we accept the claim that the behaviors performed by the agents might be the same across the two cases. In this section I want to propose a modest extension of traditional RCT such that it can better account for distinguishing between individual and collective actions.
The motivation for this extension can be seen if we return again to the theories of collective action proposed by Gilbert and by Bratman. At the core of each of their accounts of collective action, I argue, is the notion of a constraint. For Gilbert, the constraint comes in the form of a normative constraint; agents who are part of a plural subject face a normative pressure to positively act in certain ways which promote the collective action, and to refrain from acting in ways which are detrimental to the promotion of the collective action. In the example of two agents walking together, Gilbert argues that each agent has the obligation (among others) to walk at a pace which is acceptable to the other agent. Insofar as this obligation has normative force, it constrains the deliberation of each; agent X cannot rationally choose to walk in a manner inconsistent with their joint walk if she also partially constitutes a plural subject. For Bratman as well, the concept of constraint is important, though Bratman achieves that constraint through individually-held intentions rather than through directed obligations. Like obligations, however, intentions impose norms on the deliberating agent-though these norms are norms of practical rationality, and are generated from the characteristic future-directed planning roles of intentions for deliberating agents. In particular, intentions impose norms of consistency and means-end coherence, and intentions filter actions incompatible with the satisfaction of our intended outcomes; see (Bratman 2009 ). If X intends to walk together with Y , then X's intention generates norms of means-end coherence which prevent her from walking so quickly or slowly that Y is unable to walk with her.
In both theories, then, a necessary condition of agents being engaged in a collective action is that they allow their deliberation to be constrained in the appropriate ways by the goal of the collective activity. Bratman is more specific about the ways in which some individual behavior might be incompatible with the intended goal of the collective activity; they are, by and large, norms of practical rationality that dictate whether some behavior is incompatible with a collective action. Gilbert is less clear; she suggests that agents must be jointly committed to intend as a body to do some action. Intentions, for Gilbert, are a state of the will in which the agent is 'bound', and Gilbert suggests that intentions might bind 'in the same sense a decision does' (Gilbert 2006, p. 8) . This suggests that the scope of the constraint imposed by the directed obligation characteristic of being part of a plural subject is the same as that of Bratman's intention-an agent in a plural subject is rationally constrained to choose those actions which are compatible with the satisfaction of the collectively intended goal. And it's not entirely clear what else the constraint could be; agents in a plural subject certainly do not make explicit the full range of constraints they take on when they form the plural subject.
From the standpoint of RCT, the precise nature and origin of the norms which constrain deliberation are irrelevant. It does not matter, in other words, whether the constraints on an agent's deliberation are generated from ethics-based norms, or from norms of practical rationality, or from special directed obligations characteristic of plural subjects; what matters is the role they have on deliberation. And the roles that all these different types of norms play are the same: they constrain the range of outcomes an agent can deliberate over.
My proposal, then, is that we modify traditional RCT by allowing it to account for constraints-I propose that we build constraints into our RCT as a primitive on par with outcomes and value orderings. Constraints range over outcomes, and they constrain an agent's deliberation such that if an agent is constrained from choosing some outcome, then the agent cannot judge it rational to choose that outcome regardless of the comparative desirability of the outcome according to the agent's value ordering. As mentioned above, 'constraint' is a bit of an all-purpose term (in much the same way as 'preference' as it is usually used in theories of rational choice); there are many different types of constraints that an agent might have for the same decision problem. An agent might simultaneously be constrained from bringing about outcome o 1 for moral reasons, and constrained from bringing about outcome o 2 so as to maintain coherence with future-directed planning. Similarly, an unfortunate agent might find herself or himself constrained from doing anything at all in the face of some decision problem; such might be the situation that Sophie faces in Sophie's Choice.
Given this modification of traditional RCT, we can now sketch an outline of how RCT can distinguish between individual actions and collective actions where the behavioral component is the same in each. Agents who are engaged in a collective action are committed to bringing about the collective goal 8 as a collective; accordingly, each takes herself or himself to be constrained from bringing about any outcome which is not compatible with the collective goal, and also believes of the other agents that they are likewise constrained. When these conditions are satisfied, and the agents are successful in bringing about an outcome compatible with the collective goal, then the agents successfully engaged in collective action. If the agents are not successful in bringing about an outcome compatible with the collective goal, but each agent holds a collective goal and believes (whether correctly or incorrectly) that an appropriate subset of the other agents in the decision problem do as well, and each agent acts in a way believed to bring about an outcome which is not constrained, then the agents are engaged in an unsuccessful collective action. In either case, whether agents are successful in their collective action or not, the agents are engaged in collective-oriented reasoning. Finally, if agents do not believe that other agents share their constraints, or if they (irrationally) disregard the constraints they do have, then they are engaging in (perhaps irrational) individual action.
We mentioned above that constraints form a general category-that an agent's constraints in some decision problem include all of the agent's constraints, including moral constraints and practical constraints. We might worry, then, that this notion of constraint is too broad to account for collective action. The worry is that collection action should be done in accordance with constraints of the collective action, rather than whatever constraints the agent might have. Suppose X and Y both hold a prohibition against killing, and so they both constrain themselves from killing some third party W . Surely, the objection goes, the fact that two agents share a constraint of this kind is not sufficient for the agents to be engaged in a collective action?
Such general constraints do not suffice for agents to be engaged in collective actionat least not generally. We should be careful here, however. First, we should be careful not to equate 'constraint' with 'lack of a reason to perform'. An agent is constrained from bringing about outcome o so long as it is irrational for the agent to bring about o even if the agent's value ordering ranked o the highest. An agent merely lacks a reason to bring about o is the agent has greater reason to bring about some other outcome o .
Moreover, decision problems are not typically open-ended. Rather, decision prob-lems consist of only those actions and outcomes which make up the agent's subjective representation of her or his decision problem. It is not the case that agents actively deliberate over a very large number of potential actions; as deliberating creatures we are cognitively limited and often lighten the cognitive load whenever possible. It is thus imprecise to say that agents' constraints against e.g. murder are regularly invoked in their deliberation; for many of us, and for many of the decisions that we make, the option of killing someone simply never enters into our deliberation. Any constraint that we might have against killing, then, is often latent and uninvoked, and cannot be cited as the basis for a collective action. This suggests that insofar as two agents do share the same constraints in some particular decision problem, regardless of the nature or source of those constraints, the agents are engaged in a collective action. Moral constraints can serve as the basis for collective action just as collective intentions do; two agents who are each morally constrained against bringing about some outcomes in a particular decision problem and who also believe that the other agent is likewise morally constrained can be said to be engaged in a collective action (albeit a rather weak one). The collective action in this case can be described as something like "be collectively moral". Though this is an admittedly weak notion of collective action, being collectively moral is distinct from being individually moral. Individual morality is concerned strictly with the individual agent's actions; the agent who is constrained by individual morality does not take outcomes to be constraints that she or he cannot control or affect. When agents are engaged in a project of being collectively moral, they do take outcomes to be constraints even when the outcomes constrain the behaviors of other agents in the group.
The same holds when the constraints come from intentions. X's individual intention constrains only her actions, and Y 's individual intention constrains only his action. Insofar as they share an intention, however, the intention constrains each of their actions equally. Collective action is possible when agents share an intention-that is, when agents each hold the same intention; when agents do not share an intention (or constraints which are functionally identical to an intention), they are engaged in individual action-even if they each have individual intentions, and even if they act so as to bring about an outcome that they each individually intend. 9 (The man who has a dollar and wants four quarters, and the woman who has four quarters and wants a dollar, can act so as to bring about an outcome that they each individually intend; this does not entail that in doing so, they have thereby acted collectively.) I do not want to suggest that a rational choice theory involving constraints suffices in itself to give an account of collective action. There might be many conditions that still need to be satisfied in order to understand what collective is and whether some set of agents is engaged in it. What I claim here is that a rational choice theory involving constraints suffices to model (at least some of) the distinctive differences between deliberation in pursuit of a collective action and deliberation in pursuit of an individual action. And to that extent, rational choice theory involving constraints can be a part of a good RCT-based explanation of collective action in ways that traditional RCT cannot.
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Given this account of constraints, we might well wonder where constraints come from, and how constraints bind agents. Constraints cannot be too firm; if so, agents would never be able to change them. On the other hand, constraints cannot be too soft, or else they cannot actually constrain an agent's deliberation.
In the case of collective action, it is best to separate the issue into two matters. The first deals with the normative pressure of adopted constraints; the second with the conditions under which a constraint can be modified. Gilbert suggests that the constraints that are characteristic of collective actions can not be rescinded by any one agent; in effect, Gilbert argues that once an agent is bound to a collective action, the agent remains bound until the collective intention expires of its own or until the plural subject dismisses the intention. Something like Gilbert's position may well be correct-that is, once a constraint has been adopted, that constraint remains in effect until it is dismissed. Now, Gilbert seems to suggest that individual agents cannot unilaterally annull the constraints that come from participation in a plural subject, but this seems to be wrong. There is a certain amount of wrongness that might accompany annulling a constraint-and the amount of wrongness seems at least in part a function of how the constraint was initially acquired-but an agent might choose to annul a constraint and thereby rid herself or himself of any obligation to abide by the constraint during deliberation.
In other words, so long as a set of agents share a constraint with respect to some decision problem, that constraint has its usual normative force. Should one of the agents defect from the collective action, she or he might be wrong in doing so; the other agents might be justifiably upset that the agent defected. The harm that is caused by the agent's defecting might continue to linger. But once the constraint itself is annulled, the constraint has no normative authority over the agent. It's not clear whether we should say in this situation that the agent has the unilateral right to annul the constraint or not. It is certainly the case that whether the agent is right or wrong in annulling the constraint depends on the other agents in the collective, and to this extent agents do not have the unilateral right to annul. But it is also the case that agents have the unilateral power to annul a constraint, and to render it the case that that particular constraint exerts no normative force over the agent in future deliberation.
This raises the question of where constraints come from in the first place. To give a complete account of this here would go well beyond the scope of this paper, as to give a complete account of this will also give an account of where norms come from and why they exert rational force on us. It is worth mentioning here that agents do have a kind of creative power with respect to constraints: agents can form rational constraints de novo. This may be a Kantian story (as, for instance, in (Korsgaard 1996) ), but it needn't be; just as agents have a limited power to render something valuable merely by deeming it to be so, so too do agents have a limited power to render norms unto themselves merely by deeming it so.
With this power, however, comes responsibility as well. Not every constraint that an agent imposes on herself or himself is rational, and so agents have the rational obligation to ensure that they only impose rational constraints upon themselves. And if they should fail in that rational obligation? I confess that my intuition is to say that the irrational constraints are still constraints, regardless of the fact that they were formed irrationally, and that they have all the normative force of any other constraint whether rational or irrational. But this is a difficult subject, and one which is better treated elsewhere.
One more question should be addressed regarding constraints. It might be objected that constraints do not need to be built into our RCT as primitives at all-that if constraints are relevant for deliberation, then they will be accounted for through the agent's value ranking. And this is an attractive position, at least in instances of individual action. After all, it is admittedly prima facie problematic for an agent to say that she has voluntarily constrained herself from bringing about outcome o, and yet that she also judges it best to bring about o. And it is equally prima facie problematic to claim that the factors which lead an agent to think it appropriate to constrain herself or himself are not already reflected in the agent's judgments about which outcomes it is best to bring about.
Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons for thinking that constraints should not be modeled as reducible to, or assimilated into, the agent's value rankings. The first reason is that constraints can act as a valuable rule of thumb for creatures with limited deliberation time and cognitive capacities. If we assume that deliberation is costly, then the ability to reduce the complexity of one's computation task by constraining one's self to not choose clearly inferior outcomes can increase the value of the outcome which is ultimately produced.
The second reason for thinking that constraints should not be reducible to an agents' value rankings is that deliberately-imposed self-constraints are much more plausible in the multi-agent case than in the single-agent cast. In the single-agent case, the only interests in play are the agent's own interests; constraining one's own interests thus seems like a counter-productive measure. In the case of multi-agent choice situations, however, the situation is different; cooperation and collective action sometimes require that agents past aside what they individually think is best for the good of the collective. Moreover, we should not assume that insofar as agents do so, they do so only because they are maximizing their own good in the long run by choosing the best outcome they can bring about. Agents do sometime fail to bring about an outcome which they judge better, even when they might be able to bring about the outcome with no detrimental effect upon their reputation, etc. The claim that agents never constrain their own interests for the good of the group is so disconfirmed by evidence that it can only be advanced by people in the grip of an implausible version of psychological egoism which holds that agents always act in accordance with their strongest preference, where 'preference' here means both judgmental preferences (i.e. one's judgment of the reasons one has to act) and motivational preferences (preferences that cause a person to act).
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My proposed solution, then, is that we augment RCT with primitive constraints; an RCT with constraints is capable of distinguishing between individual actions and collective actions even when the behavior profiles are identical between the two. As mentioned earlier, another option is to go the plural subject route: collective actions are performed by a plural subject, not by a set of agents.
The superior approach, I argue, is the RCT with constraints model. There are two main problems with the plural subject model. First, the plural subject theorist of RCT has to explain the connections between the plural subject and the individuals who constitute the plural subject. According to the plural subject model, neither X nor Y are performing any action; rather, it is the plural subject Z that is acting. And since X is not acting, X is not acting on behalf of reasons, whether her own or those of the group. We thus have no way to talk about X's reasoning on behalf of the collective goal: whether the reasoning is good, or bad, whether her choices are rational or irrational. The fact that X is a member of a collective and engaged in a collective action does not mean that X's task is over with respect to practical reasoning; it merely means that she has to reason on behalf of the collective goal rather than the group goal. According to the plural subject theorist of RCT, however, X is not reasoning about what action to perform, and so X has nothing left to do.
The second main problem with the plural subject approach in RCT is that we need to determine how it is that mental attitudes of the group distribute to attitudes of the individuals. As we argued above, instances of individual action are behaviorally indistinguishable from instances of collective action. This means that for every case of collective action, a set of behaviors is performed. The plural subject theorist must argue that these behaviors are performed by a plural subject and not by a set of individuals. We might wonder, though-how can it be that the exact same behavior is performed in one case by one agent, X, and in the other case it is performed by a part of a plural subject? How, in other words, is the part moved to act in virtue of the attitudes of the whole? Suppose X and Y have a collective goal of walking at the same speed-that is, they constrain themselves so as to not bring about either the (quick, slow) outcome or the (slow, quick) outcome. It is rational, then, for X and Y to bring about either the (quick, quick) outcome or the (slow, slow) outcome. Which should the plural subject bring about? And, more important, how do X and Y reason about what to do in virtue of the judgments of the plural subject? The attitudes of the plural subject presumably have to distribute to the individual agents somehow, and yet Gilbert does not suggest a way that this might be done.
Gold and Sugden do suggest a way that it might be done: they suggest that there is a characteristic mode of reasoning, team reasoning, which distributes the reasons of the group to the reasons of the individuals. But the problem with Gold and Sugden's approach is that it requires unanimity among the members of the collective about the collective's value ordering. Team reasoning cannot work unless every agent reasons according to the same value ordering. As we saw above, this condition is too strongcollective action is certainly possible, and indeed occurs quite frequently, even when the members of a group disagree about the comparative desirability of various outcomes available to be produced. And if this is correct, then we have reason to reject the plural subject model of RCT.
I do not take these arguments to be decisive against a plural subject interpretation of RCT for accounting for collective action. I do think, however, that the plural subject interpretation faces challenges. Constraints play an important role in facilitating collective action; they allow the members of a collective to express their own views about the best options for the collective, and indeed to try to persuade others in the collec-tive to pursue some outcome rather than others, by ensuring that when it is time for the agents to deliberate and act, they are all willing to constrain their own judgments in deference to the judgment of the team. For the plural subject theorist, there is no diversity among the collective, everyone reasons exactly the same. This is an unrealistic view of collective action, but it is necessitated by the fact that a monolithic plural subject must be invoked in order to account for the difference between collective and individual action.
9
In the end, what kind of analysis is this? The goal of this paper is not to propose a way to bring about more cooperation, nor is it a detailed analysis of the concept of cooperation or collective action. The aim of this paper was to show that RCT is incapable of distinguishing between two events which any adequate explanatory theory of action should be able to distinguish: namely, the difference between a collective action having been performed, and an individual action. I rejected the view that the difference between the two lies in whether a 'cooperative outcome' is brought about, since the same behavioral outcome might be brought about either through an individual or a collective action. Given this, I agued that the best way to account for the difference between the two is to augment our rational choice theory with constraints, so that we can appeal to collective constraints in explaining collective actions.
